The Right Answer to the Right Question "; document. The BOTEC approach is balanced, aware of the costs of both criminal and drug-using activity as well as the enforcement efforts designed to reduce that activity.
It really was a pleasure; the Senators asked precise and perceptive questions and avoided speechifying. In my oral presentation, I stressed the idea that cannabis prohibition is no longer operationally feasible in the U. Full text after the jump.
Testimony of Mark A. Kleiman Professor of Public Policy Director of the Crime and Justice Program Marron Institute of Urban Management New York University Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade Senate of Canada March 22, It is an honor to be allowed to offer my views on the design of a legal market for cannabis, a topic that has absorbed a substantial part of my attention throughout my career in government and in academia.
Since the topic is complex and time is limited, what follows cannot be a full exposition of all the complexities and uncertainties, and it omits the An analysis of mark a r kleiman due to the many colleagues whose work it reflects.
To be complete and properly sourced, each numbered point below would need to be a chapter. The great gains from legalizing cannabis sales for non-medical use are the resulting shrinkage in illicit commerce and the provision of legal supply to adults who wish to use the drug and can do so temperately.
The great potential loss from legalizing cannabis is increased intemperate use. A large increase in use by minors is substantial in terms of potential harm but modest in terms of probability.
Rates of problem use in total use are roughly comparable to those for alcohol, for example.
In the United States, problematic cannabis use has increased very markedly, both absolutely and compared to the total number of users, over the past quarter-century.
That figure amounts to approximately 4 million people nationwide. Insofar as cannabis substitutes in the economic sense for other, more harmful intoxicants — including alcohol — legalization might lead to significant gains in public health and public safety.
There is some — though not yet definitive — evidence that greater cannabis availability tends to lead to less opiate use medical and non-medical and less opiate-related harm. Evidence on substitution for — or, alternatively, complementarity with — alcohol, remains scattered and mixed.
Cannabis is, as a legal product, quite cheap to produce. Even with normal processing costs and retail markups, pre-tax prices once the licit market is mature should be expected to be a small fraction of illicit-market prices, or even current dispensary prices.
Very low prices encourage intemperate consumption. The precise causal relationships remain unclear, but there is no assurance that further price declines — already marked in the U. That fact alone suggests that heavy use is likely to be price-sensitive.
On the other hand, price is of little concern to ordinary cannabis consumers. The current cost of cannabis use for someone who has not built up a tolerance is very approximately 50 cents per intoxicated hour. Therefore, the social gains from lower prices are unlikely to be significant, while the risks are substantial.
This suggests that preventing further price decreases ought to be among the design elements of a prevention-oriented cannabis policy.
Preventing the growth of cannabis use disorder requires preventing the collapse of cannabis prices. The most direct means of managing prices would be state-monopoly retail distribution, after the pattern of alcohol monopolies in some provinces.
However, equivalent results could be achieved by taxation or by limiting production rights and conducting periodic rights auctions. Ad valorem taxation — with the tax stated as a percentage of retail prices — is an unsatisfactory policy tool in this case, because ad valorem taxes fall along with market prices, which is the opposite of the desirable pattern.
Specific excise taxation based on product weight does not have that drawback, but it does tend to provide an undesirable tax incentive for producing and selling high-potency product to minimize the cost to the consumer of achieving any desired level of effect.
Imagine taxing whiskey and beer at the same rate per ounce. That suggests that cannabis products should be taxed according to their content of THC, the primary active agent in cannabis. Taxation based on THC also avoids the complexity of having different tax rates for different forms of cannabis e.
Taxes designed with prevention in mind will constitute a large fraction of the final retail price, as is now the case with tobacco. Such taxes would be very high indeed in value-per-bulk or value-per-weight terms, making them attractive targets for tax evasion, including illicit supply.
Some enforcement efforts will be needed to prevent the growth of secondary cannabis markets resembling the current markets in untaxed tobacco products. There is an argument for keeping taxes low during the transition to legality in order to speed the extinction of the existing illicit cannabis market, and then increasing them gradually, ideally with the schedule of tax increases built into the initial legislation.
A THC-based tax system would require a system of product testing. The measurement problems of determining the chemical content of non-homogeneous dry materials are far from trivial. However, measuring for chemical content has health benefits, aside from its value in tax administration.
Accurate labeling of cannabis products according to their chemical content represents an additional source of gain for consumers from legalization, because it could enable them to better regulate their cannabis intake to achieve the desired psychological state without accidental over-intoxication, which while not very dangerous can still be highly unpleasant.
The same measurements needed for appropriate taxation are thus also valuable for consumer protection. One danger of legalization is the creation of an industry whose financial resources give it political power, and whose political power is wielded for purposes at odds with the public interest."Mark Kleiman's new book, When Brute Force Fails, draws on the bedrock of economic logic--rational actors using incentives to make optimal decisions--to arrive at a sweeping overhaul of how we deter, punish and sentence Kleiman says we can have more effective deterrence by becoming more efficient in the use of resources to control crime.
comes Mark Kleiman’s new book, “When Brute Force Fa ils”, in which the “deterrence principle” is resurrected to “rescue community corrections” (as one reviewer of the book suggests). In one sense, the ideas in Kleiman’s book are hardly anything new. Nov 24, · Mark A.R.
Kleiman @MarkARKleiman Professor of Public Policy at NYU/Marron, student of drug policy and crime control.
Seriously, folks: . By Mark A. R. Kleiman Rated / 5 based on 1 reviews This authoritative and objective analysis of US drug policy by Mark Kleiman (Public Policy | UCLA, and Harvard alumnus) explains how to choose among alternative ways 5/5(1). Second, three special people were prominently involved in the program’s assessment—Judge Alm, the inventor, and two evaluators, Angela Hawken and Mark A.
R. Kleiman. Alm was important because he is charismatic and committed to spreading the good news about his Project HOPE. Mark A.R.
March 22, By Mark Kleiman @markarkleiman Today I had the pleasure and honor of testifying before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Canadian Senate. It really was a pleasure; the Senators asked precise and perceptive questions and avoided speechifying. JUNE 28, FINAL Page 2 of 11 TableofContents!! Why!limit!production?!_____!3! Between and , Kleiman worked for the Office of Policy and Management Analysis in the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, and from he was the director of the same office, and a member of the National Organized Crime Planning Council.
Kleiman, MPP, PhD, is the chairman of BOTEC Analysis and a world-renowned expert in crime reduction, justice, and drug policy. In addition to his work with BOTEC, Dr. Kleiman is a Professor of Public Policy and the Director of the Crime Reduction & Justice Initiative at New York University’s the Marron Institute, a member of the Committee on Law and Justice of the United States.